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Abstract. Attack trees are used in cybersecurity analysis to give an 
analyst a view of all the ways in which an attack can be carried out. 
Attack trees can become large, and developing them by hand can be 
tedious and error-prone. In this paper the automated generation of attack 
trees is considered. The method proposed is based on a library of attack 
templates – parameterisable patterns of attacks such as denial of service 
or eavesdropping – and that also uses an abstract model of the network 
architecture under attack. A pseudocode implementation of the method 
is also presented. The example application given is from the automotive 
domain and using an architecture consisting of linked CAN networks – 
a network configuration found in virtually every current vehicle. 
Keywords: Attack trees · Generation · Automotive · Cybersecurity. 
1 Introduction 
Attack trees are a well-known graphical model for capturing and analysing at-
tacks on a system [12]. Their intuitive simplicity and ability to succinctly capture 
all attacks on a system have made them popular in many domains, including 
SCADA systems [2], ATM security [4], the analysis of insider attacks [11] and 
the automotive domain [1]. They give an analyst an overview of all the known 
ways in which an attack can be carried out, and show how single attack steps 
combine and build into complex attacks. 
Attack trees are directed acyclic graphs with a single end node, which is the 
goal of the attack. To construct an attack an analyst considers all the steps 
which would immediately lead to the goal of the attack being realised. These 
become the subgoals, or intermediate leaves of the tree. Each of these leaves is 
now considered as a (sub)goal, and the steps that would lead to it’s realisation 
are identified. The process is recursively repeated until the branches of the tree 
cannot be further expanded. This process can be time-consuming, especially 
for large attack trees [4] and several researchers have therefore investigated the 
automatic generation of the trees [6,13,10,5]. 
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Within the literature, two main approaches to automating the generation 
or synthesis of attack trees have developed: (i) model transformation and (ii) 
semantic-based construction. In the model transformation approach, a target 
system and attackers are modelled using either graphical [6] or formal [13] pre-
sentations as input. The desired target of the attackers is identified, and from 
this the tree root from which the tree construction starts is established. In [6], 
system models contain actors, processes, items and locations, and connections 
between these elements to the desired target are utilised to develop the attack 
tree. Similarly, systems and attackers in [13] are modelled in a process calculus 
as input. They are first transformed into propositional formulae. Given a tar-
get location, these formulae are utilised to construct attack trees by means of 
backwards-chaining search. While techniques in the model transformation ap-
proach are automated, they suffer from lacking a basis for correctness. There is 
no rigorous relation between generated attack trees and the attacks implicitly 
implied from input models. In order to fill this gap, [10] proposed ATSyRA, an 
interactive tool for synthesising attack trees from attack graphs. First, ATSyRA 
generates all attack paths from the input graphs by model checking. Then, users 
are required to specify a refinement relation between a set of actions to recur-
sively refine attack paths to eventually construct an attack tree. While ATSyRA 
establishes the semantic connection between the constructed tree and the input 
model via attack paths, it is not fully automated. To overcome this shortcoming, 
[8] introduced an approach to extending an existing attack tree by means of a 
library of attack trees. The extension is enabled by adding logical preconditions 
and assertions to tree nodes. Then an attack tree from the library can be at-
tached to a node of the attack tree to be extended if certain relations between the 
preconditions and assertions are satisfied. To this end, logical reasoning must be 
employed. Similarly, [5] has proposed a different approach which is based on the 
formal semantics of attack trees [7]. To this end, the synthesis problem becomes 
that of generating attack trees from a given semantics, i.e., a set of attack traces. 
It is reduced to a biclique problem, which is known to be NP-complete, and a 
heuristic algorithm is suggested for the construction. 
In this paper we propose a method for the generation of attack trees based 
on templates: abstracted and parameterizable known patterns of attack, and 
represent steps such as spoofing of one node by another, or eavesdropping on 
traffic between two nodes, which together can be built up into an attack. The 
method takes as input a description of the architecture of the network that is 
being attacked and the set of templates. 
These networks are modelled by graphs consisting of nodes and connectivity 
information. Each node represents a component of the network. The network 
information required includes the access points. These are the nodes within the 
network that are exposed to attackers outside the network. We present a method 
that applies each element from the library of attack patterns to the graphical 
network model in order to form attack trees. We give as well an algorithm for 
our method. Given a network and a set of templates, the algorithm can generate 
all possible attacks conforming to the template library. 
3 A Template-based Method for the Generation of Attack Trees 
The contributions in this paper are the template-based method for the gen-
eration of attack trees and it’s algorithm, and the automotive example demon-
strating the method. The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 begins with an 
introduction to automotive communication networks and attack trees. In Sec-
tion 3 we give the description of the template-based methodology for generating 
attack trees, and in section 4 we give the pseudo-code description of the gener-
ation algorithm and briefly present the results of our automotive example. 
2 Background 
2.1 Automotive communication network 
An automotive communication network facilitates the communication between 
electronic control units (ECUs) within a vehicle. It is usually divided into sub-
networks of related ECUs. Depending on the communication requirements of 
each subnetwork (such as bandwidth, time, etc.), different network types can 
be employed such as CAN, CANFD, FLEXRAY, LIN, ETHERNET, etc. These 
networks can be interconnected via Gateway ECUs which will coordinate the 
traffic between them. 
GatewayADS
ECM TCU ESC SBW
OBD-II
TBOX BCM PEPS AVM
SRS
Fig. 1. An automotive internal network. 
In this paper, we model an automotive communication network as a tuple 
(NET, ECU, AP, net) where NET is a finite set of subnetworks, ECU is a finite 
set of ECUs, AP ⊆ ECU identifies ECUs that are accessible to attackers (such 
as OBD-II or TBOX), and net : NET → ℘(ECU) is a mapping to determine 
to which subnetwork an ECU belongs. For example, the network in Figure 1 is 
modelled by Mf = (NETf , ECUf , APf , netf ) where: 
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– NETf = {CAN1, CAN2, CAN3, CAN4}; 
– ECUf = {ECM, TCU, ESC, SBW, SRS, ADS, Gateway, OBD-II, TBOX, 
BCM, PEPS, AVM}; 
– APf = { OBD-II, TBOX }; 
– netf = {CAN1 7→ {ECM, TCU, ESC, SBW, SRS, Gateway}, CAN2 7→ 
{TBOX, BCM, PEPS, AVM, Gateway}, CAN3 7→ {ADS, Gateway}, CAN4 7→ 
{OBD-II, Gateway}}. 
2.2 Attack trees 
Attack trees contain a goal (teh root of the tree), a set of sub-goals, structured 
using the operators conjunction (AND) and disjunction (OR), and leaf nodes, 
which represent atomic attacker actions. The AND nodes are complete when 
all child nodes are carried out and the OR nodes are complete when at least 
one child node is complete. 
Extensions have been proposed using Sequential AND (or SAND) [7]. 
We follow the formalisation of attack trees given in [7,9]. If A is the set of 
possible atomic attacker actions, the elements of the attack tree T are A ∪ 
{OR, AND, SAND}, and an attack tree is generated by the following grammar, 
where a ∈ A: 
t ::= a | OR(t, . . . , t) | AND(t, . . . , t) | SAND(t, . . . , t) 
Attack tree semantics have been defined by interpreting the attack tree as a 
set of series-parallel (SP) graphs [7]. 
3 Methodology 
We develop a method to generate attack trees from a network model and a 
library of attack tree templates. Attack tree templates are building-blocks to 
assemble an attack tree. Each template from the library represents an attack 
step within the network which can be applied to different subnetworks and/or 
ECUs. The adaptability of the attack to various subnetworks and ECUs can be 
captured by using variables within the template. When the templates are fully 
instantiated with concrete values from the sets of the network model, it provides 
a concrete example of an attack on the network. 
For example, attacks on a communication network can be categorised into 
two passive or active attacks; eavesdropping and traffic analysis are two examples 
of passive attacks, while spoofing, replay and DoS (Denial of Service) are active 
attacks. This is captured in Figure 2. Variables are used in all the leaves of 
this template which can be replaced by concrete values. Let us consider the 
leaf Eavesdrop X:NET. The variables X can be replaced by any value from the 
component NET of the network model.If we consider the network model Mf as 
depicted in Figure 1, X can be replaced by CAN1, CAN2, CAN3 or CAN4. 
The connectivity between ECUs within the network will be represented in 
attack tree templates using lists. When instantiated, a list of ECUs corresponds 














Fig. 2. An initial attack template tree. 
to the ability to send data from the first ECU in the list to next one, then the 
next one, and so on until the data reaches the last ECU in the list. This means 
consecutive ECUs in the list must belong to the same subnetwork. Gateway 
ECUs may appear in the list to capture the connectivity between ECUs of dif-
ferent subnetworks. For example, if we consider the model Mf , a list of ECUs is 
[ECM, TCU, Gateway, TBOX] where ECM is connected to TCU and TCU to 
Gateway in CAN1, and Gateway to TBOX in CAN2. 
The generation of attack trees starts with a specified template from the li-
brary. This template has no closed variables. The generation is carried out recur-
sively. At each recursion, a leaf which may contain open variables is considered 
for expansion. When there are n > 0 assignments for the open variables, this 
leaf node is converted into an OR node with n children with each child corre-
sponding to one assignment. The assignments are copies of the leaf node where 
the open variables are replaced by values. Each child is then replaced by a tem-
plate from the library where the name of the template root matches the name 
of the child and the parameters of the root can be unified with the parameters 
of the child. The unification of the parameters will give rise to an assignment of 
closed variables of the template. The replacement of the child with the template 
will also replace all closed variables with the values from the assignment. This 
process is illustrated in Figure 3. A white circle represents a node with variables 
while a black one states that its variables have been replaced with values by 
some assignment. 
A special case of assignments is for unassigned lists. An assignment for an 
unassigned list [X .. Y] is a list of constants from NET and ECU. The start and 
the end of the list must satisfy any condition for X and Y. For example, consider 
the network Mf . An unassigned list [ECM..Y:AP] must be assigned to a list of 
ECUs from ECM to an ECU that is an access point, i.e, in APf . There are two 
ECUs that Y can be assigned to: OBD-II and TBOX. Then, one of the list of 
connected ECUs that [ECM..Y:AP] can be assigned to is [ECM, TCM, Gateway, 
TBOX] where they are consecutively connected and the last ECU (TBOX) is an 
access point. Obviously, this is not the only assignment. Two of other candidates 
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to assign this list to are [ECM, Gateway, TBOX] and [ECM, TCM, Gateway, 
OBD-II]. 
Assigned lists [X|Y] recursively describe a list with X as the head of the list 
and Y as the remaining elements, i.e., the tail of the list. [ ] stands for an empty 
list. An assigned list [X|Y] normally appears at the root of some templates. When 
it is unified with a list of elements, X will be unified with the head and Y will 
be unified with the tail. For example, if the list [ECM, TCM, Gateway, TBOX] 
is unified with [X|Y], then X = ECM and Y = [TCM, Gateway, TBOX]. 
Fig. 3. Methodology. 
3.1 Attack tree templates 
More formally, nodes in an attack tree template may contain parameters which 
are made of variables, list terms or constants (i.e., elements of NET and ECU 
of a network model). Variables can be instantiated with node names. Let N be 
a set of names for tree nodes, V a set of variables and C = NET ∪ ECU a set of 
constants. The syntax of an attack tree template is defined below: 
tree ::= leaf-node |
tree-node AND(tree, . . . , tree) |
tree-node SAND(tree, . . . , tree) |
tree-node OR(tree, . . . , tree) 
leaf-node ::= n parameter ∗ 
∗tree-node ::= n parameter 
parameter ::= variable | list | c 
variable ::= X[“ : ”type][/Y [“ : ”NET]][#Z[“ : ”ECU]] 
type ::= NET | ECU | AP 
list ::= unassigned-list | assigned-list 
unassigned-list ::= [ variable “..” variable ] 
assigned-list ::= [ variable “|” variable ] 
where X, Y ∈ V , n ∈ N and c ∈ C. 
Informally, an attack tree template is an attack tree in which each node 
contains a name and possibly a list of parameters. A parameter can be a variable, 
a constant (node names) or a list of variables and constants. Variables occurring 
in the root node of an attack tree template are called closed variables. They may 
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reoccur in the descendants of the root. Once root variables are instantiated, their 
values are propagated down to the descendant nodes correspondingly. In contrast 
to closed variables, variables in a template that do not appear in its root are 
called open. 
We postulate the following conditions on the occurrence of variables on an 
attack tree template: 
– Assigned lists can only appear at the root; 
– Open variables can only appear at the leaves; 
– Unassigned lists can only appear at the leaves. 
The assignment of values to variables can be restricted with types, by using 
the condition “: type”. This condition restricts a variable to be instantiated 
with a constant of type NET, ECU or AP. For example, consider the network 
in Figure 1. Given X:NET, X can only be assigned to CAN1, CAN2, CAN3 or 
CAN4. Given X:ECU, X can only be assigned to ECM, TCU, Gateway, OBD-II, 
BCM or TBOX. AP stands for access points OBD-II and TBOX, i.e., places 
where attackers can have cyber access to the network. Then, X:AP says that X 
can only be assigned to OBD-II or TBOX. A further restriction can be introduced 
to the assignment by “/ Y : NET”. Once Y is instantiated with a constant of 
type NET, “X / Y:NET” states that X can only be assigned to an ECU within 
the subnetwork Y. For example, “ X / Y:NET” where Y is CAN1 means that X 
can only be assigned to ECM, TCU, or Gateway. Finally, one can require that X 
is not assigned to an ECU by using the restriction #Z where Z is of type ECU. 
Once Z is instantiated with an ECU, X cannot be assigned to that ECU. 
3.2 A simple example 
We illustrate our method on an automotive network, depicted in Figure 4(a). It 
contains two CAN buses: the powertrain, consisting of three ECUs: ECM (Engine 
Control Module), TCU (Transmission Control Unit) and GW (the Gateway). 
and the telematics bus, containing two ECUs: TBox (Telematics Box) accessible 
to attackers and the same GW, which connects the two buses. 
This network is modelled by a tuple (NETm, ECUm, APm, netf ) where: 
– NETm = {CAN1, CAN2}; 
– ECUm = {ECM, TCU, GW, TBOX}; 
– APm = {TBOX}; and 
– net = {CAN1 7→ {ECM, TCU, GW}, CAN2 7→ {GW, TBOX}}. 
We then consider a library of attack tree templates that focus on how to 
compromise ECM. The library consists of two templates, depicted in Figure 4(b) 
and (c). The template (b) describes a compromise attack on ECM. Essentially, 
this attack can be realised by starting compromising an ECU to which attackers 
have access to (Z:AP). Then, the compromise attack can be propagated to the 
next ECU connected to a compromised one until we reach ECM. This is described 
by the unassigned list [Z:AP .. ECM]. The template (b) is also specified as the 








[ Z:AP .. ECM ]
(b) 
CompromiseFromTo










Fig. 4. The compromise attack template tree. 
start tree of the generation process. The template (c) describes how compromise 
attack can be carried out from the first ECU to the last in the list [Z|L]. Note 
that Z is the head of the list and L is the tail. On Fig. 4(c) the arrow between 
the edges leading to the two nodes indicates that both nodes must be carried 
out in order (a SAND node). Not joining the edges in Fig. 4(c) signifies an OR 
node, and joining edges with a line (rather than an arrow) signifies that the root 
node is an AND node. 
This is done by taking control of the ECU Z at the head of the list and then 
recursively taking control of the rest of the list. Taking control can be done by 
either re-flashing or gaining root access to Z. 
Initially, the construction starts with the template (b) in Figure 4. The leaf of 
this expanded tree “CompromiseFromTo [Z:AP .. ECM]” is now considered for 
further expansion. It has an open parameter which is an unassigned-list. There 
are two possible assignments for it; one is [ECM, GW, TBOX] and the other 
is [ECM, TCU, GW, TBOX]. However, the second list is considered redundant 
as ECM is directly connected and can communicate with GW without using 
TCU. This is derived from the nature of CAN bus communication where ECUs 
on the same bus are directly connected with each other. Therefore, the leaf is 
appended with one child corresponding to the assignment of [Z:AP .. ECM] to 
[ECM, GW, TBOX]. This child is then expanded by the template (c) in Figure 4. 
This template is used several times depending on the length of the list. Finally, 
we obtain the tree3 which has height 9 and contains 17 nodes. 
4 Implementation 
We now present the algorithm used to implement our generation method (Algo-
rithm 1.) The inputs are (1) a model of the network structured as in Section 2 
and (2) a library of attack tree templates and it produces an attack tree as the 
output. 
3 The tree can be viewed at https://tinyurl.com/s55u7qh. 
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Algorithm 1 Generating attack trees 
1: function BuildTree(Model, Library) 
2: tree ← InitTree ∈ Library 
3: while ∃leaf ∈ tree, subtree ∈ Library: leaf matches subtree do 
4: assignments ← getAssignments(leaf, Model) 
5: Turn leaf into an “or” nodes 
6: for each assignment of assignments do 
7: assignedLeaf ← apply(assignment, leaf) 
8: unification ← unify(subtree, assignedLeaf) 
9: add apply(unification, subtree) as a child of leaf 
10: end for 
11: end while 
12: return tree 
13: end function 
The algorithm starts with the initial tree InitTree from the input library in 
line 2. It then loops as long as there is a leaf on the constructed tree and a 
template, namely subtree, from the library that can be matched. In this loop, 
all assignments for the variables of the leaf are first computed in line 4. Then 
for each of the assignments, a unification of subtree and the application of the 
assignment to the leaf is calculated in line 8. Then the subtree to which the 
unification is applied is added as a child of the leaf in line 9. Note that the leaf 
is now converted into an “or” node in line 5. The loop at line 3 will continue 
until no more leaves and matching templates can be found. 
The function apply replaces attack tree template variables with the corre-
sponding values in the input assignment, from the root to the leaves recursively. 
unify in line 8 is a standard unification procedure. It tries to unify the root of 
subtree with the leaf to which the considered assignment is applied. It yields a 
unifier which can be considered as an assignment to the whole subtree. 
getVarAssignments generates Cartesian product of all assignments for the 
variables and unassigned lists in the input leaf. 
Experiment 
We briefly present the experimental result of our implementation on two exam-
ples, implemented in Python4 and carried out on a PC with a processor Intel 
Core i5-4590 3.3GHz with 8GB of memory. 
We first rerun the mini example described in Section 3.2 which confirms 
the output tree obtained in Section 3.2. Using Python “cProfile” module, the 
run-time of this experiment is 0.025s and uses 19739 function calls. The second 
experiment4 is to generate an attack tree for the automotive network Mf as 
depicted in Figure 1. It consists of 4 CAN bus networks with 12 ECUs. The 
template library contains 21 attack tree templates, including the initial tree as 
depicted in Figure 2. In total, the run-time is 0.292s, using 574133 function calls. 
4 The source code can be downloaded from https://tinyurl.com/uoptgfb. 
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The generated attack tree5 has 3756 nodes and of height 19. An attack example 
extracted from the tree is an eavesdropping attack carried out at a compormised 
TCU. Access was gained at the TBOX, then the gateway was compromised 
followed by the TCU: 
GainRoot(TBOX) → Reflash(GW) → Reflash(TCU) →CollectDataFrom(TCU). 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we have proposed a practical method for identifying all the possible 
attacks on a known system. We use a library of templates of the atomic attack 
steps that can be taken against components in the system and give an algorithm 
for building these into a tree capturing all the attacks. Future steps will include 
adapting to other types of networks including wireless and ethernet, and also 
mixed networks which include networks running under different protocols. We 
also plan to integrate the automated attack tree generation work presented here 
into work on model-based security test-case generation which currently assumes 
the existence of the attack tree such as [3]. 
References 
1. Bryans, J., Nguyen, H., Shaikh, S.: Attack Defense Trees with Sequential Conjunc-
tion. In: 19th IEEE HASE. pp. 247–252 (2019) 
2. Byres, E.J., Franz, M., Miller, D.: The use of attack trees in assessing vulnerabilities 
in SCADA systems. In: IEEE Conference IISW (2004) 
3. Cheah, M., Nguyen, H., Bryans, J., Shaikh, S.A.: Formalising Systematic Security 
Evaluations Using Attack Trees for Automotive Applications. In: WISTP’17 
4. Fraile, M., Ford, M., Gadyatskaya, O., Kumar, R.: Using attack-defense trees to 
analyze threats and countermeasures in an ATM: A case study. Lecture Notes in 
Business Information Processing 267, 1–21 (2016) 
5. Gadyatskaya, O., Jhawar, R., Mauw, S., Trujillo-Rasua, R., Willemse, T.A.C.: 
Refinement-aware generation of attack trees. In: STM, vol. 10547, pp. 164–179 
6. Ivanova, M.G., Probst, C.W., Hansen, R.R., Kammüller, F.: Transforming graph-
ical system models to graphical attack models. In: Mauw, S., Kordy, B., Jajodia, 
S. (eds.) Graphical Models for Security, vol. 9390, pp. 82–96. Springer 
7. Jhawar, R., Kordy, B., Mauw, S., Radomirović, S., Trujillo-Rasua, R.: Attack trees 
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